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Abstract. This article describes impediments to multilateral inspections that are sanctioned by a 
multilateral political entity to proscribe the development, production, storage, deployment, and 
employment of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
You are an aspiring inspector on a multilateral team sanctioned by a multilateral political entity. The 
purpose of the team is to proscribe the development, production, deployment, and employment of 
weapons of mass destruction. The host country of the inspection may not be a willing participant. Based 
on the seven-year experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), you may run into a 
few problems. 
 
Motivational impediments of team members. Some members of your team will be most interested in 
their financial remuneration. They will not want to endanger access to this remuneration. Given that 
energetic and proactive inspecting may well lead to complaints by the host country including demands 
that "offenders" be removed from your team, members with a significant financial motivation may be 
more likely to sin through omission instead of commission--doing too little as opposed to pushing the 
envelope of inspecting expertise. (This "doing too little" also seems to be the adaptive bias of many 
survivors of careers in organizations.) On the other hand, those who are forced to give up some or all of 
their remuneration to their sponsoring countries may be more susceptible to financial and other 
inducements to act in a manner consonant with the needs of the host country as opposed to the 
sanctioning multilateral entity. 
 
Some members of your team may be intelligence assets--most likely collectors or agents of influence--
controlled by the host country or by their sponsoring countries. They may even be assets of the 
multilateral entity that may at least partially have an agenda divergent from the public purpose of your 
inspection team. Such members may intentionally act at cross-purposes to your team. 
 
Some members may have personality and professional agendas that induce behavior contrary to the 
purpose of your team. Personality agendas may include the needs to provoke confrontation, to find 
duplicity regardless of its significance or validity, to conform or not to conform with procedures, or to 
create or not to create enemy images. Professional agendas may include then needs to maintain prior 
positions or to seek more prestigious or desired ones. Other personal and professional Issues include 
concerns about meeting one's preferred life style and challenging styles of stress management that can 
significantly affect inspection abilities and motivation. And, of course, there are the common problems 
of personality chemistries, envies, jealousies, cross-cultural communication inadequacies, and the like. 
 
Motivational impediments of sponsoring countries and of the sanctioning multilateral entity. 
Motivations may change over the course of time. Political stances that seemed appropriate through a 
strategic-moral calculus may seem quite different in the light of events sometime after the initial 
commitment to mandate and support inspection. In other words, sponsors and sanctioners may decide 
to work contrary to the purpose of your inspection team--sometimes unbeknownst to that team. The 
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same may occur through a phenomenon that seems to be captured by the psychological construct of 
habituation. 
 
Motivational impediments of the host country. The host country may be an unwilling participant 
because what you intend to proscribe it desires to prescribe. Even if this were not the case, the host 
country may view its senses of sovereignty, nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, tradition, and self-
efficacy as being violated. The consequential probability of deception is high. The consequential effect of 
deception may only be limited by the host's deceptive and the team's counterdeceptive abilities. 
 
This brief motivational analysis suggests that a multilateral inspection's form and substance barely 
masks a plethora of competing dynamics. Your stint on the team may well be unsuccessful as to its 
stated purpose but a complete success as to entering through a looking glass into a wonderland of 
deceit from friends and enemies alike. (See Boyer, P.J. (November 9, 1998). Scott Ritter's private war. 
The New Yorker, pp. 56-73; Crossette, B. (November 6, 1998). U.N., avoiding talk of force, criticizes Iraq 
on arms team. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Knapp, B.L. (1997). Beckett's That Time: 
Exile and "that double-headed monster…time." Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations, 15, 493-
511; Walton, M.D. (1998). Ostensible lies and the negotiation of shared meanings. Discourse Processes, 
26, 27-41.) (Keywords: Deception, Inspection, Motivation: The International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998 as an Act Against Freedom, the Truth, and Religious Freedom.) 
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